Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2013

Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market?: Reflections on Amgen
and the Second Coming of Halliburton
Donald C. Langevoort
Georgetown University Law Center, langevdc@law.georgetown.edu

Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 13-058

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1226
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2281910

This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Litigation Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

DRAFT: NOVEMBER 16, 2013

Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market?:
Reflections on Amgen and the Second Coming of
Halliburton
Donald C. Langevoort*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds,1 a
solid majority of the Supreme Court held that proof of the materiality of
alleged misstatements or omissions was neither necessary nor appropriate to
certify a class action on behalf of investors who bought or sold in the
aftermath of the falsehoods. At issue was the meaning—both substantively
and procedurally—of the so-called “fraud on the market” presumption that
had been established by the Court twenty-five years earlier in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 2 whereby all such investors are presumed to have relied on the
alleged fraud if they traded in an “efficient” market for those securities that
was distorted by fraud. The majority in Amgen said that the Rule 10b-5
class certification inquiry in the face of such a presumption is limited to
*

Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
133 S.Ct. 1184 (2013). The majority opinion was written by Justice Ginsburg.
2
485 U.S. 224 (1988). I have explored Basic extensively in prior work, particularly
Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 Wisc. L.
Rev. 151; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities
Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 851, 886-96 (1992); Donald C.
Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to
Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135, 182-86 (2002). The Amgen dissenters cast
doubt on Basic by pointing out that it was decided a four-justice majority. Due to vacancies
and recusals, the Court’s most committed business conservatives did not participate in the
case (though it is worth noting that the Reagan-appointee dominated SEC came in as
amicus on the side of the plaintiffs). See 2009 Wis. L. Rev. at 156-57, 163. In any event,
as the Amgen majority points out, Basic is officially a majority (not a plurality) opinion,
meriting precedential weight. 133 S.Ct. at 1192 n. 1.
1
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issues not susceptible to class-wide proof. Materiality, being a single
objective inquiry, is a class-wide question and hence not directly relevant to
certification. Three justices (Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy) disagreed, in
two separate dissents, saying that proof of materiality is a condition
precedent to earning the presumption of reliance, without which
certification necessarily fails because commonality unravels.
But this seemingly technical procedural issue exposed something far
more fundamental. The three dissenters made clear that they thought Basic
was wrongly decided in 1988, and Justice Alito joined the majority but
wrote a cryptic concurrence strongly suggesting that the Basic presumption
has a shaky foundation that warrants future reconsideration by the Court.
The defense bar wasted no time in taking up the four justices’ invitation and
sought review in a case that had already been up once to the Court, Erica P.
John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 3 now asking that Basic be overruled.
Certiorari was granted in November 2013.
This is portentous, the possible death of a cause of action that has
been the centerpiece of private securities litigation for the last forty years. 4
Just in the last fifteen, private securities class actions (the vast majority of
which are fraud-on-the-market) produced for investors more than $70
billion in settlements; in ten of those years, plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees alone
totaled more than $17 billion. 5 On the defense side, these cases are just as
big a revenue source for lawyers, if not bigger, and it is not hard to imagine
some large law firm securities litigators fearing for their practices and
privately praying that these kinds of cases somehow survive.
3

Shortly after Amgen, the Fifth Circuit held that Amgen and the Court’s earlier Halliburton
decision together are properly read to foreclose any price distortion argument as part of the
class certification decision. Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 2013 WL 1809760 (5th
Cir. 2013). The earlier decision before the Court, discussed infra, was Erica P. John Fund
v. Halliburton Co., 131 S.Ct. 2179 (2011), rejecting defendants’ argument that a showing
of loss causation was an essential predicate to class certification.
4
See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, The Fraud on the Market Tort, 66 Vand.
L. Rev. --- (forthcoming, 2013).
5
See JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST, DAMAGES AND RELIANCE UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE
EXCHANGE ACT, Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance Working Paper Series No. 150,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2317537 (Aug. 28, 2013).
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This essay was originally intended as a reader’s guide to the
securities law aspects of Amgen. But with the future of Basic now in doubt
in Halliburton II, there is much more to the exercise. Understanding Amgen
is crucial because the issue there exposed the consequences of granting such
a capacious presumption. As both sides conceded in their debate about who
exactly was putting the cart before the horse 6—plaintiffs surely bear the
burden of proving materiality in order to win their case. The question was
when, i.e., whether it occurs pre-discovery. 7 The dissenters’ main argument
was that it is efficient to get rid of cases where the misstatements are likely
to be immaterial earlier rather than later, and not unfair given the generous
gift that Basic’s presumption affords the plaintiff class when materiality can
be established.
But of course there is much more than just timing. Leaving
materiality to trial means, in all likelihood, that a jury makes that
determination instead of the judge. Materiality debates often turn on a mix
of qualitative and quantitative evidence, the latter not likely to be
understood particularly well by lay jurors. Defendants may reasonably
suspect that they will fare better before a judge for this reason alone.
Moreover, at trial there may be little to control for the trumping effect of
hindsight bias—the inflated inference that because something bad happened
later on, those on the inside must have suspected it all along and so bear
responsibility for it. 8 Given the large sums of money at stake plus the high
6

Compare 133 S.Ct. at 1191 with id. at 1211 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Materiality determinations are aided by discovery to the extent that they deal with
questions like the probability of an event’s occurrence at the time of the public statements,
or how seriously the issue was taken inside the company at the time. On the other hand,
stock price reaction evidence—which as we will see, becomes a central issue much of the
time—tends not to be. Even that, however, takes time to develop. The lower courts that
had made materiality an issue in class certification disagreed as to who had the burden of
proof on the defendant to rebut materiality. See In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Lit.,
544 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2008)(plaintiff’s burden); In re DVI Inc. Securities Litig., 639 F.3d
623 (3d Cir. 2011)(defendant may rebut).
8
See G. Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 773 (2004). This is
important because the approach to materiality with respect to speculative, future-oriented
events is to ask the jury to balance the probability that the event would come to pass as of
the time of the fraud against its likely magnitude—essentially an expected value
calculation. This test was endorsed in a separate holding in Basic. On the somewhat
7
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costs of litigating just to get to trial, this fear supposedly contributes to
settlement pressure, which happens almost inevitably if a class is certified
and survives motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Thus plaintiffs’
strong desire to defer as many contestable issues as possible to trial, and for
defendants to fight vigorously for pre-discovery resolution of the same.
Amgen was just one of many settings where defendants had pushed for such
an acceleration of a merits issue, and the Court’s rejection was thus a
significant strategic win for plaintiffs in countering these moves.
Given the Supreme Court’s recent pro-defendant inclinations in
securities class actions and class actions generally, including another sizable
win for the class action defense-side just a few weeks after Amgen 9, this
settlement-bolstering win was surprising to many. 10 Indeed, reading the
defense-side briefs in Amgen gives the clear impression they thought the
Court would bless this tough stance to class certification because it was
sound conservative policy to do so, and they expected a majority of the
justices to do so simply by adhering to that instinct. 11 But they failed,
which raises the crucial question for Halliburton II and the future of fraudon-the-market: why did the Chief Justice side unequivocally with the

surprising background to the Court’s resolution of this issue, see Donald C. Langevoort,
Investor Protection and the Perils of Corporate Publicity: Basic Inc. v. Levinson, in THE
ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 257 (Jonathan Macey, ed. 2008).
9
Comcast Corp. v. Behrends, 133 S.Ct. 24 (2013).
10
I will leave to the civil procedure experts the task of reconciling Amgen with the
noticeably contrary trend in class action litigation that is increasingly open to some degree
of “merits” inquiry. See Linda Mullenix, Class Action Cacophony at the Supreme Court,
Nat’l L.J. (April 15, 2013), at 28.
11
The dissenters worked hard to find in the Basic opinion itself an implicit precertification materiality requirement, in order to make this move seem not just a simple
exercise of judicial policy-making, the evidence for which did not impress the majority. In
fact, the parties could not cite any instances where a court insisted on a materiality showing
as crucial to class certification until the mid-2000s. If such a requirement was implicit in
Basic, then, it lay undiscovered for a surprisingly long period of time. Unmentioned in
Amgen is the Sixth Circuit’s opinion on remand in Basic, which rejected the defendants’
request for summary judgment on materiality and sent the case to the district court for trial,
prior to which the case settled. See Levinson v. Basic Inc., 871 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1989).
The court expressly affirmed the class certification even though materiality remained a live
issue at trial.

4
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majority in Amgen, given his defendant-friendly votes in other close fraudon-the-market decisions like Stoneridge 12 and Janus Capital? 13
To me, there is a point in the opinion that seems crucial to
assembling that unexpected majority. As noted earlier, a strong thrust of
the dissents was the “in terrorem” effect of class certification, impelling
settlements even where merits issues like materiality and scienter are
questionable—by now a familiar point in the case law—as good reason for
an early assessment of materiality. This, of course, invokes the debate that
has raged well before Basic about purported class action abuses, and which
led Congress to substantially reform private securities litigation in 1995. In
recent years, defendants have vigorously been making the argument that
Congressional action in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act has
implicitly “frozen” the outer limits of fraud-on-the-market class actions,
precluding the judiciary from further expansion. This connects to the
conservative critique of 10b-5 litigation generally, which despises its
origins in the form of a judicially implied right rather than Congressional
action, and has long claimed that these litigation scope issues are warrant
The Supreme Court’s
legislative reform than judicial invention.14
Stoneridge decision articulates the “frozen in 1995” idea explicitly. 15
But that is presumably a two-way street, indicating just as strongly
that those doctrines that were firmly in place in 1995 are protected by that
same logic. Albeit without an explicit citation to Stoneridge, the Amgen
majority makes much of the fact that Congress rejected efforts to overturn
Basic, while at the same time making so many important substantive and
procedural changes (but not to the relevant aspects of class certification) to

12

Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
14
See Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative
Securities Jurisprudence, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 933, 934-36 (2013).
15
Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165-66 (2008)(“It is
appropriate for us to assume that when [the PSLRA] was enacted, Congress accepted the
§10(b) private cause of action as then defined but chose to extend it no further”).
Stoneridge was addressing the extent of secondary liability in fraud-on-the-market suits.
13
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counter settlement pressure and excessive liability. 16 Indeed, the structure
of the PSLRA makes no sense except when read as a political compromise
that preserves the foundation of the fraud-on-the market class action while
making it harder for plaintiffs bring, plead and prove a successful claim
through a variety of reforms. 17 So it occupies the field, in a way that
disappointed both the most insistent champions and the most strident critics
of private securities litigation. When this happens, the natural conservative
judicial move is to defer.
Justice Thomas acknowledged this in his dissent, at least arguendo,
but said that this implied endorsement of Basic and the foundations of
fraud-on-the-market do not preclude courts from adjusting the contours of
the right of action by “interpreting” Basic. 18 That is true, but only within
bounds. Given the well-established status of materiality as a fact question
in numerous Supreme Court decisions both pre- and post-1995, 19 the
majority’s point that Congress could have adjusted the law relating to
materiality and class certification determinations if it had wanted, but chose
other potent reforms instead, has considerable strength. This was the thrust
of a Seventh Circuit decision rejecting the role of materiality in class
certification written by Frank Easterbrook, Schleicher v. Wendt, 20 saying
that “[w]e do not think it appropriate for the judiciary to make its own
further adjustments by reinterpreting Rule 23 to make likely success on the
merits essential to class certification in securities-fraud suits.” This was
potent endorsement of deference to the PSLRA by a conservative scholar
16

133 S.Ct. at 1200-01.
The legislative history of the PLSRA has been thoroughly explored and makes clear
that the statute was about fraud-on-the-market litigation. See, e.g., John W. Avery,
Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. Law. 355 (1996). So, this is not simply a case of
Congressional silence in order to create implied endorsement, on which the law has been
inconsistent for over a century. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative
Inaction, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 67 (1988). On Congress’ recognition of some degree of market
inefficiency within this framework, see pp. --- infra. For a contrary view of the
implications of the PSLRA, see GRUNDFEST, supra).
18
Id. at 1213 n.9.
19
E.g., TSC Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, supra;
Matrixx Inc. v. Siricusano, 131 S.Ct. 1309 (2011).
20
618 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2010).
17
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and judge quite expert in both the theory and practice of private securities
litigation, 21 in a case cited repeatedly by the Amgen majority.
I suspect that this instinct about separation of powers, more than
anything, is what brought the Chief Justice over to the plaintiff’s side in
Amgen. We will have to wait and see how durable this idea turns out to be
in Halliburton II. Obviously, it is a much bigger question whether the
extensive combination of legislative action and inaction in 1995 constitutes
a political acquiescence in Basic’s presumption per se, not just its
mechanics. But if the Chief Justice truly agreed with what Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion said about the policy choice implicit in the PSLRA,
Basic should survive.

II. MATERIALITY, PRICE DISTORTION AND CORRECTIVE DISCLOSURE

The disagreement in Amgen was about whether an early showing of
materiality in an evidentiary hearing should be the price plaintiffs have to
pay for Basic’s generous presumption of reliance and the class certification
that readily follows. 22 That obscures the real debate, in ways that will no
doubt surface more visibly in Halliburton II.
Materiality is a deceptively simple idea, describing that which
reasonable investors likely consider important, i.e., relevant to the value of
the issuer’s securities. It is generally a fact question, but for years courts
have fought over the appropriate size of the “immaterial as a matter of law”
category whereby courts can and do dismiss cases on the pleadings, prior to
discovery. The “puffery” defense is the best known example, readily
21

See note [29] infra.
Basic permits a rebuttable presumption of reliance upon a showing that an investor
traded during the relevant class period (i.e., after the misrepresentation but before
correction), that the trading was on an “efficient” market, and that there was a material,
public misstatement that distorted the market price. This presumption of reliance, in turn,
has been seen as essential to a finding of commonality under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to justify class certification.

22
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embraced as a means of getting rid of complaints where the alleged
misrepresentation was in the form of general corporate optimism. 23 The
assumption here is that reasonable investors don’t (or shouldn’t) put stock
in vague representations of the sort that have no solid factual content.
While this category is well established and often invoked, the Supreme
Court has twice unanimously warned against too heavy-handed a judicial
usurpation the fact-intensive materiality inquiry, in Basic itself 24 and then
more recently in Matrixx Inc. v. Siricusano. 25
When plaintiffs bring a securities class action, the pleadings
inevitably claim that the truth withheld from investors was very important.
Apart from disputing what the truth was (a pure fact question) or whether it
was fully appreciated by the defendant (a scienter inquiry) the most
common response by the defense is a “truth on the market” defense: that the
market already knew the truth, so that whatever the defendant said was
unimportant even if it was false. 26 This can be established qualitatively, by
calling market participants as witnesses and demonstrating, through
contemporaneous publicity or published research, that there was an
adequate understanding of the true state of affairs to disregard
management’s supposed deception. The latter appears to be what
defendants were anxious to do in Amgen.
As one can imagine, however, this kind of evidence is normally
countered by plaintiffs’ own experts and publicity survey. For some time
now, the question of whether there is a noticeable stock price reaction to the
alleged misstatement has been considered the best test to resolve contests

23

See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 639-42 (7th
ed. 2013).
24
In Basic, the Court ruled that speculative information about merger negotiations could
be material, rejecting a “materiality as a matter of law” claim that such negotiations only
become important when an agreement in principle is reached between the parties. See note
[8] supra.
25
131 S.Ct. 1309 (2011)(rejecting a claim that statistically insignificant instances of
harmful effects from a new drug were necessarily immaterial).
26
See COX ET AL., supra, at 637-39.
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between fraud-on-the-market and truth-on-the-market. 27 Where a corporate
lie is particularly dramatic and credible—false corporate “news”—we can
expect a visible and prompt price reaction, usually on the upside. Indeed,
that intuition is the basis of the fraud-on-the-market presumption. And that
stock price distortion—measurable via an event study—would tell us nearly
everything necessary for plaintiffs to succeed or fail. The reaction itself
suggests that the information is material, and that distortion triggers Basic’s
presumption of reliance. The amount of the price distortion in turn might
also be a good measure of damages. Indeed, it was this promise of a
rigorous, empirical approach to materiality, 28 reliance and causation via the
event study tool that early on made the fraud-on-the-market theory
appealing even to fairly conservative judges and academics, a story I have
explored in more depth elsewhere. 29
But the simplicity was an illusion.30 As was the case in Amgen, the
typical fraud-on-the-market case does not involve a single dramatic lie.
Rather, it involves a story that begins when the issuer is doing reasonably
well. Gradually, however, things start turning bad and eventually the issuer
is forced to reveal its troubles, at which point the stock price is much lower
than it was during the good times. Plaintiffs will work to show that
management knowingly or recklessly concealed those troubles. But
27

Jonathan Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance and
Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1017, 1021 (1991).
28
See Roger Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the
Total Mix, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 373 (1984), cited in Basic.
29
See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra, at 163-64. The seminal work here is Daniel
Fischel, Use of Modern Financial Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities, 38 Bus. Law. 1 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Optimal
Damages in Securities Cases, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 611 (1985); Daniel Fischel, Efficient
Capital Markets, the Crash, and Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 907
(1989). Easterbrook and Fischel gather these ideas together in their classic book THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). Credit for this vision is also due to
Judge Patrick Higginbotham, who introduced this kind of economic analysis to the fraudon-the-market case law, even before Easterbrook and Fischel, in In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88
F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1980). Judge Higginbotham, later promoted to the Fifth Circuit, has
had a significant impact on the law since then as well.
30
See Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after Halliburton, 90 Wash.
U. L. Rev. 895 (2013).
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concealment is not necessarily unlawful (another one of Basic’s
fundamental lessons 31), and so there will have to be a showing that
particular misstatements or actionable omissions, usually half-truths,
distorted the stock price. For a variety of reasons, finding measurable
distortion is often hard. First, the alleged lies come out in dribs and drabs,
and allegedly have the effect to preventing a decline in the stock price, not
actually pumping it up. Second, these alleged lies are often coupled with
lots of other information about the issuer, some of which was presumably
accurate. There is simply no way of measuring distortion with precision in
settings like these. Often there is no visible change in stock price at all, on
which defendants seize for their truth-on-the-market defense.
Well before Basic, plaintiffs responded to this difficulty by turning
attention not to the date(s) of the alleged lie(s) but rather the event of
corrective disclosure—when the truth was later on brought home to the
market. When there was a big stock price drop after such disclosure,
plaintiffs would argue by backwards induction that this was the drop was a
good measure of the cumulative extent of the original distortion (and the
right measure of damages as well). 32 But once the inquiry extends to a
potentially lengthy period of time between the original lie and the corrective
disclosure, it is likely that there will be many intervening or supervening
events that also make their way into the correction, making it hard—if not
impossible—to disentangle all the effects with any econometric rigor. The
case law in this area exploded in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Dura
Pharmaceuticals decision, 33 with its insistence that plaintiffs put forth
persuasive evidence of a price correction attributable to the fraud in order to
establish “loss causation,” as is their statutory burden after the PSLRA.
Exploring how the courts have responded to all this is beyond the
scope of my article; 34 it is by all accounts a doctrinal and practical mess. 35
31

See Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of
the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1059 (1990).
32
See, e.g., Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure
Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 883 (1990).
33
Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
34
See Fisch, supra; Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra, at 178-89.
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Courts vary considerably in how much they demand of plaintiffs, but many
cases are insistent that if plaintiffs cannot show with rigorous evidence that
there was either a price distortion at the time of the fraud or a deflation in
price later on due to the revelation of the truth (not some separate causal
event), they lose. Of course, if this burden is imposed only at the trial on
the merits, it may be largely illusory for the reasons discussed earlier—the
case will be settled before then. In response, more aggressive courts began
finding ways to accelerate this inquiry, taking us to the present
controversies. As an effort to weed out these cases, class certification was
appealing because it would permit an early evidentiary hearing, going well
beyond the pleadings. The Supreme Court has now shut the door on using
class certification to do this, first holding that loss causation is not an
appropriate certification inquiry in the first iteration of Halliburton, 36 then
holding the same with respect to materiality in Amgen. 37
Even though plaintiffs have won a considerable strategic victory
here, this kind of pre-discovery skirmishing resembles the game of whacka-mole in the way that these issues keep reappearing under different
labels. 38 For example, in a controversial series of opinions pioneered by
35

See Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 Iowa
L. Rev. 811 (2009); James C. Spindler, Why Shareholders Want their CEO’s to Lie More
After Dura Pharmaceuticals, 95 Geo. L.J. 653 (2007); Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, Loss
Causation Requirement for Rule 10b-5 Causes of Action: The Implications of Dura
Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 63 Bus. Law. 163 (2007); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 66 Md. L. Rev. 348 (2007);
Merritt B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J. Corp. L. 829
(2006); Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, the Supreme Court and Causation under
the Federal Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 1 (2005).
36
Erica John Fund v. Halliburton Corp., 131 S.Ct. 2179 (2011). See Fisch, Halliburton,
supra.
37
Technically, price distortion might be seen as different from both materiality and loss
causation, though this did not persuade the Fifth Circuit in Halliburton II. See note --supra.
38
Still uncertain, for example, is the extent of plaintiffs’ pleading burden with respect to
price distortion and loss causation.
Even summary judgment is a possibility,
notwithstanding the highly disputed factual nature of these issues. See In re Williams Co.
Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009). The court found a way to summary judgment
via Daubert. The district court, properly in the Tenth Circuit’s view, excluded the
plaintiff’s expert evidence entirely for failing to make the necessary scientific showing for

11

DRAFT: NOVEMBER 16, 2013

then Judge Alito in the Third Circuit, 39 where there is no stock price
reaction to a misrepresentation or omission (or to the corrective disclosure
when that is used for backwards inference), the information can be deemed
immaterial as a matter of law and the case dismissed for that reason alone,
quite apart from class certification. 40
If read strictly, this is a troubling doctrine. 41 The question of why
there was no immediately visible stock price reaction is factually complex.
Sometime reactions to information are delayed because of the subtlety of
the disclosure or its “buried” nature, even in well-developed markets.
Sometimes there is no reaction because, as noted earlier, the alleged fraud
diffuses a price reaction that would have occurred in the absence of the
fraud, and there is no obvious corresponding correction event because the
information has already leaked into the market or because the correction has
been bundled with other good news about the issuer. While there will be
some cases where the mix of qualitative and qualitative evidence of truthon-the-market is strong enough to justify pre-discovery dismissal, 42 most
are likely to involve substantial ambiguity.
So what this is really all about is the burden of palpable uncertainty.
Some believe that as a matter of policy, fraud-on-the-market lawsuits
should not go forward in the absence of persuasive qualitative and
quantitative evidence of price distortion, even though all of the above is
admissibility; thus there was no factual contest any more. In sum, Williams concedes the
likelihood of serious fraud closely connected with the reasons companies typically go
bankrupt—hidden financial weakness—and yet dismissed the class action in its entirety.
39
E.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997); for
perhaps the most notorious example, not by Alito, see In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432
F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005), which uses immateriality as a matter of law even though there
clearly was a later corrective reaction to the news once it became salient enough.
Compare, e.g., Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650 (4th Cir. 2004). See
generally Stefan Padfield, Who Should Do the Math? Materiality Issues in Disclosure that
Require Investors to Calculate the Bottom Line, 34 Pepperdine L. Rev. 927 (2007).
40
That could be an explanation for Justice Alito’s choice to concur rather than dissent in
Amgen: he may have been convinced that class certification is not the right place to deal
with these issues because there are other pre-discovery opportunities for dismissal when
price distortion isn’t obvious.
41
See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra, at 189-91.
42
E.g., Smith v. Circuit City Stores, 286 F. Supp.2d 707, 721 (E.D. Va. 2003).
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possible, simply because the resulting speculativeness invites too much
questionable litigation and costly settlements. 43 We will take up aspects of
this issue, which motivate the effort to overturn Basic, in the remainder of
my article. For now, simply note that the disagreement about who has to
show evidence of price distortion, and what that evidence consists of, has
by no means disappeared from the pre-discovery battles after Amgen, even
if Basic survives. 44

III. ON WHAT? EFFICIENCY, RELIANCE AND REBUTTABILITY

I have written at length elsewhere about the confusion Basic creates
in trying to explain the precise nature of the presumed reliance, and how
and why this relates to market efficiency. 45 Unfortunately, Amgen repeats
rather than resolves this muddle. This allows Justice Alito, in his
concurrence, to put in play the future of the presumption insofar as it may
rely on a “faulty economic premise” in light of our more nuanced (and to
some extent skeptical) understanding of market efficiency. The dissenters
seem anxious to do the same. 46 So this becomes the life or death question
for the fraud-on-the-market theory.

43

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption?, 60 Bus. Law. 533 (2005).
Perhaps even within class certification, there will be an opportunity to try to use their
evidence of an absence of price distortion to argue that the market is therefore not efficient.
See Lassaad Turki & Mark Allen, Amgen—What Has Not Been Said So Far!, 45 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1046 (June 3, 2013); see also MUKESH BAJAJ & SUMON C. MAZUMDAR,
ASSESSING MARKET EFFICIENCY FOR RELIANCE ON THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET
DOCTRINE
AFTER
WAL-MART
AND
AMGEN,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2302734 (July 29, 2013). My sense is
that this kind of argument has to be evaluated very skeptically. See pp. --- infra.
45
See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra, at 166-78.
46
133 S.Ct. at 1206 Scalia, J.)(“the regrettable consequences of the four justice opinion in
Basic); id. at 1212-13 n. 4 (Thomas, J.)(“The Basic decision is itself questionable”). The
majority opinion recognizes the kinds of questions modern finance raise about efficiency—
including its non-binary character, but truncates the discussion by stressing that this is not
the case to address these issues.
44
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Market efficiency is the basic idea that as a result of competitive
research by market professionals and other mechanisms, “news” about an
issuer will be promptly incorporated into its stock price, so that traders
thereafter cannot reasonably expect to profit from such news. 47 It follows
that most traders should not try—they can and should “free ride” on the
professionals’ work by simply assuming that the consensus price is the best
publicly-available estimate of the security’s value. Index funds are
commonly given as a good example of a rational, low-cost investment
strategy in response to market efficiency. 48
Basic’s muddle is this. There are plenty of free-riders in the market.
But there are just as many, if not more, who try to identify mispricing
opportunities—stocks that seems undervalued or overvalued—and hence
are not trusting the market to have gotten the valuation right. Of course
some of these do the research and actually rely on the misinformation, but
not all. Any presumption based simply on the assumption of passive freeriding will be necessarily over-inclusive, 49 which raises disturbing questions
about excessive liability as a result, because each and every class member is
entitled to damages.
But this is not the only, or even the standard, justification for a
presumption of reliance. Midway through Basic—and again in Amgen 50—
there is a subtle shift to the idea of reliance on “price integrity” for what is
being presumed. An investor assumes that the market price is undistorted
by fraud, even if he or she thinks the stock may be under- or over-valued.
Here, active as well as passive investors would be entitled to the
47

Actually, it starts simply from the empirical observation that after a prompt period of
adjustment to news, there are no significant cumulative abnormal returns—the price is as
likely to go up as down—so that we can fairly say that the information has been impounded
in the stock price. The precise mechanisms of market efficiency remain contested. See
Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years
Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. Corp. L. 715 (2003).
48
See Burton Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and its Critics, 17 J. Econ. Persp.
59 (2003).
49
See Grigori Erenburg et al., The Paradox of “Fraud-on-the-Market Theory”: Who
Relies on the Efficiency of Market Prices?, 8 J. Empirical Leg. Studies 260 (2011).
50
133 S.Ct. at 1192-93.
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presumption, even in the absence of actual reliance, which is how Basic has
generally been understood by commentators 51 and applied by the courts. 52
Yet the muddle doesn’t end here, because rational investors do not
assume any such thing. Sadly, corporate fraud is not uncommon; one recent
estimate suggests that the probability of any given public company
engaging in fraud in a particular year is as much as 14.5%. 53 In an efficient
market, the residual fraud risk is priced, not assumed away. 54
What Basic does, as much as anything, is create an entitlement to an
undistorted stock price via, as I have described it, an act of juristic grace. 55
This is no different from what happens in the common law of fraud. In a
face-to-face negotiation between strangers, there is no reason necessarily to
assume that what the counterparty is saying is the truth. Yet the law creates
a right to rely on sufficiently factual misrepresentations, at least, in order to
promote efficient economic exchange in the face of palpable uncertainty
about honesty, by making it safe to assume honesty. 56
The most straight-forward way of articulating this—advocated by
Easterbrook and Fischel, for example—is to jettison reliance entirely and
give investors a right to recover whenever they show price distortion that
harmed them. 57 This is a pure causation approach, and there is a fascinating
back story to Basic here. Private correspondence between Justices
Blackmun and Brennan while Basic was being was being drafted shows
51

See, e.g., Fischel, Crash, supra.
See, e.g., Black v. Finantra, Inc., 418 F.3d 203 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Worldcom Inc. Sec.
Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
53
See ALEXANDER DYCK ET AL., HOW PERVASIVE IS CORPORATE FRAUD? (Feb. 2013),
available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2222608.
54
But because traders can gain as well as lose from fraud (if they are sellers at an inflated
price), this market risk may not be all that great. See sources cited in note --- infra.
55
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra, at 161. A pre-Basic recognition of this is Lipton v.
Documation Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 748 (11th Cir. 1984)(“The theory . . . actually facilitates
Congress’ intent . . . by enabling a purchaser to rely on an expectation that the securities
markets are free from fraud.”) Basic cites Lipton, with a page cite to this quote but not the
quote itself. 485 U.S. at 246.
56
See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 111 (7th ed. 2007).
57
See note --- supra; see also Fisch, Halliburton, supra.
52
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Blackmun stubbornly insisting that “transactional reliance” has to be
preserved and a simple causation approach rejected. 58 Their main point of
disagreement has to do with whether a trader who was committed to selling
without regard to the price (their hypothetical is someone who decides to
divest immediately the shares of a company doing business in South Africa)
is harmed by fraud-induced price distortion: Brennan’s causation approach
says yes, Blackmun’s transactional approach says no. Blackmun does edit
the opinion in a couple of places to accommodate Brennan’s preferred
locution of “price reliance,” 59 though still unconvinced that there is much
substance to the distinction. Brennan disagrees (and is not sure that
Blackmun yet understands his point) but finally gives up, willingly
concurring because he realizes that once the presumption is invoked, the
possibility that anyone will try to rebut it and challenge individualized
reliance will be rare. 60 Largely, he was right. But Blackmun’s insistence
on maintaining transactional reliance as the basis for the presumption leaves
the decision incoherent and unsatisfying. 61

58

A copy of these letters is on file with the author. The phrase “transactional reliance,”
referring to Blackmun’s insistence that actual reliance is essential, seems to be Brennan’s.
He distinguishes this from his preferred idea of “price reliance.” See Letter of January 22,
1988, from Brennan to Blackmun, at 1 (“I fear that the Court’s opinion may be read as
approving transactional reliance rather than price reliance”)(on file with the author). Adam
Pritchard uncovered this correspondence in the course of his historical research, and I am
grateful to him for copies. For previous use of this correspondence, see Langevoort, Basic
at Twenty, supra, at 153 n.9, 157 n.25, 160 n.38; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra; see also
STEPHEN CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 32425 (2005).
59
See Letter of January 25 from Blackmun to Brennan, at 1. I suspect that these edits and
additions were the reason Basic is so hard to understand as to reliance—it tries to reconcile
the price and transactional ideas (while clearly preserving the latter) without recognizing
the underlying tension.
60
See Letter of January 27 from Brennan to Blackmun (“The difference between us is
now clear. In my view, the market relies on the defendant’s misstatement, and plaintiffs
are defrauded because they are forced to act through the market. Your view requires that in
addition plaintiffs specifically depend on the integrity of the market, that is, that the market
is fair.”) Whether he was aware of it or not, Brennan was channeling Easterbrook and
Fischel in these comments.
61
My point here goes solely to the effort to describe the presumption in reliance terms.
To me, Basic would make a great deal of sense in terms of conferring an entitlement to rely
on the integrity of the market, which I think was what Brennan (and Easterbrook and
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Consider the important case of the index fund. 62 Index funds are the
poster children for passive low-cost investment, compelled to buy or sell
stocks solely to maintain a weighted average of the chosen market index.
They thus seem to fit perfectly within the free-riding vision articulated in
Basic and Amgen. 63 But these investors are entirely insensitive to
information insofar as their entire methodology is just to mirror the index.
Even if told the truth about a particular issuer, they would still have to buy
or sell to conform to the index. So why aren’t they just like the investor who
committed to divest from South Africa?
A possible way out of the muddle is to see the entitlement to
undistorted stock prices as granted to the market generally. If so, then there
might be a number of different ways to rely that are within the zone of
protection. One is through passivity, assuming that the market is doing the
best possible job of valuation in light of the entitlement. This might include
index funds even if their actual decisions are information-less, though this is
still not entirely clear. 64 Another is through active investing, either through
actual reliance on the misinformation in question or an investment strategy
that seeks to beat the market but nonetheless utilizes the prevailing market
price as an informational component of the investment decision. In other
words, assuming an acceptable showing of price distortion—which is what
the Amgen majority and dissenters were arguing about—the presumption is
properly given to any active or passive purchaser or seller during the class
period to whom the integrity of the stock price could be relevant, i.e., who
would not necessarily have made the same investment decision had the truth
Fischel) were reaching for. For an elaboration of the economic justification for protecting
reliance of this sort, see Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of
Securities Regulation, 55 Duke L.J. 711, 771-80 (2006). Brennan does use the term “price
reliance”, but it is clear from the analysis in his letters that what he really meant was “price
dependency,” since traders in an organized market have no choice but to accept the
prevailing market price.
62
See RICHARD A. BOOTH, INDEX FUNDS AND SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION (Jan. 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com=1996587.
63
For cases including index investors within the presumption of reliance, see, e.g., In re
Lehman Bros. Sec. Litig., 2013 WL 440622 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
64
Index investing relies more heavily on portfolio diversification than any strong
assumption of market efficiency to deal with issuer-specific risk.
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been revealed. That is essentially the approach used recently to justify a
disqualification of a plaintiff from taking advantage of Basic’s presumption
of reliance where the purchaser was a sophisticated active investor with a
valuation model that incorporated a set of factors entirely separate from
what the issuer was concealing from the market. 65 The court suggested that
this was an extremely rare holding, in no way suggesting that active traders
are normally disqualified from the presumption of reliance.
There are two implications from all of this. One is that once we see
Basic’s presumption as deriving from an entitlement to ignore the risk of
fraud (i.e., be compensated if that right is frustrated), the majority’s
approach in Amgen makes more sense conceptually. Price distortion is not
a predicate to the reliance; instead, the reliance is on the presumed absence
of distortion (price integrity), so that distortion merely establishes the injury
from the misplaced reliance, a true class-wide merits inquiry.
Much more important, however, is what all this says in response to
Justice Alito’s question of whether our more skeptical understanding of
market efficiency should lead the Court to overturn Basic’s presumption. If
we take that question literally, the answer is clearly no.
I have explored this question in depth, in an article Alito cites and
elsewhere, 66 and so will be relatively brief. The contemporary
understanding of financial markets makes clear that perfect efficiency is just
an ideal; all markets fall short, some more than others. 67 Informational
efficiency (i.e., how quickly information is impounded in price so that
subsequent price moves return to random) varies based on how widely
followed the issuer is as well as the nature of the information. Obscure
65

See Gamco Investors v. Vivendi S.A., 2013 WL 765122 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Although Basic is not entirely clear about market efficiency, a key footnote indicates
that the majority was not insisting on anything approaching perfect efficiency. 488 U.S. at
247 n.24. That footnote has been consciously disregarded by courts that have obsessed on
high levels of efficiency to justify the presumption of reliance. See In re Polymedica
Corp., 432 F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2005); Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra, at 168-73.
67
On legal and regulatory manifestations of this contemporary understanding, see Henry
T.C. Hu, Efficient Markets and the Law: A Predictable Past and an Uncertain Future, 4
Ann. Rev. Fin. Econ. 179 (2012).
66
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information is impounded more slowly than salient information, even for
blue-chip issuers. And sentiment-based investors (noise traders) can
sometimes move prices away from fundamental value for sustained periods
of time, producing both underreaction and overreaction to both news and
pseudo-news before the forces of efficiency cause a correction. 68
None of this, however, undermines a presumption of reliance that is
based either on the relative wisdom of passivity or an entitlement to assume
stock price integrity. Finance experts have hardly backed off the suggestion
that index investing and other passive strategies are wise for most investors,
even if the face of market imperfections. 69 Index strategies remain popular,
and profits from active trading strategies as elusive as ever. 70 Stock price
integrity is a worthy policy goal even in the face of (inevitably) imperfect
efficiency. The key question in assessing the presumption of reliance is
whether the market segment in which the securities are traded is such that it
has sufficient efficiency properties to make us reasonably confident that
misinformation is likely to distort the stock price. 71 Most well-organized
markets meet this condition. Efficiency, in other words, should just be a
proxy for those markets in which passive investing is reasonable.
Notwithstanding this, post-Amgen the defense-side has shown an
inclination to continue the class certification battle as to price distortion by
using the apparent absence of evidence of distortion as proof that for the
issuer in question, its market must thus not be efficient—raising something

68

For citations and elaboration, see Langevoort, Animal Spirits, supra. See also Lynn
Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J.
Corp. L. 635 (2003); William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Hypothesis Help Us Do
Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54 Emory L.J. 843 (2005).
69
See Malkiel, supra.
70
See Gilson & Kraakman, supra.
71
See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra, at 161-62; Macey et al., supra, at 1021 (“The
legal system should not withhold redress from an injured plaintiff simply because he owns
the security of a corporation traded in a market considered by some court to be
‘inefficient’”); Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Market Efficiency, Crashes and
Securities Litigation, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 443, 456 (2006)(efficiency inquiry with respect to the
presumption of reliance should be a relative one, and not overly demanding); Fischel, supra
(discussing efficiency implications of market volatility for Basic’s presumption).
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that clearly is a certification issue. 72 The complete absence of typical
“cause and effect” relationships between the release of news and
appropriate stock price movements would undermine an efficiency
argument, but such complete absence is rare. 73 Courts should be very
cautious about this kind of attempt, keeping in mind, as we have just seen,
that relative efficiency should not be all that high to justify the presumption
of reliance. There can be many reasons for under-reaction, including that
the market had figured out the essential truth on its own without waiting for
corrective disclosure from the issuer, or that the significance of the
information was hard to glean from the particular disclosure in question.
But the case law invites this argument, with some courts being
unrealistically demanding, 74 even though it makes very little sense. Once
again, markets do not have to approach near-perfect efficiency to be
reliable.
What we do lose faith in as a result of a more realistic assessment of
market efficiency, however, is the sharpness of the tools used to test for
materiality, causation and damage. In an imperfectly efficient market, we
can expect fraud to distort prices, but in ways that might display underreaction or over-reaction to value-related information. Even though we
might be fairly confident that there was harm, measuring that harm becomes
considerably more speculative. 75 As we saw in Part II, some of the fervent
intellectual support for the fraud-on-the-market presumption in the 1980s
came from the belief that the event study and related econometric methods
would simplify and add lawsuit-diminishing rigor to the determination of
whether alleged fraud actually harmed investors. That promise has not been
fulfilled, which no doubt has soured some judges on the entire enterprise.
To me this is what explains the emergence over the last decade of doctrines
72

See note --- supra.
E.g., Cornell & Rutten, supra, at 448.
74
See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra, at 168-77; more recently, see Meyer v. Greene,
710 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2013). This often takes the form of a court saying that once a
market is deemed efficient for certification purposes, plaintiffs must shoulder the burden of
showing that the evidence on materiality and/or loss causation is consistent with nearperfect efficiency.
75
See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, at 180; Cornell & Rutten, supra, at 457-63.
73
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that plaintiffs put forward a compelling empirical case or lose at the outset,
against which Amgen was a notable push-back.
In giving such a confident “no” answer to Justice Alito’s specific
question of whether imperfect market efficiency undermines Basic, I am by
no means suggesting that there are not larger policy questions here. There
are serious questions about whether fraud-on-the-market lawsuits generate
more costs than benefits for investors and/or our capital markets, much
more so than in 1988 when Basic was decided, 76 and considerable reason to
suspect that aggregate measures of damages systematically overcompensate.
The remainder of my article will touch on some of these larger questions.
For now, just a reminder from Part I. The courts may have invented the
fraud-on-the-market lawsuit, but the question of their soundness was
squarely on Congress’ plate in 1995. Congress chose some very aggressive
reforms (heightened pleading standards, the safe harbor for forward-looking
information, proportionate liability, etc.) but all within the framework
established by Basic, without fundamentally altering the presumption. It
even recognized the possibility of significant short-term pricing inefficiency
in one of these reforms. 77 As such, it seems difficult to cut back
76

There is now a large literature on this debate. The critique is thoroughly described in,
e.g., William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market,
160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 69 (2011) and John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class
Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its Implications, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534 (2006).
For a particularly helpful exploration of the arguments and empirical evidence, pushing
back on some of the critiques, see James D. Cox & Randall Thomas, Mapping the
American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence of the
Enforcement of U.S Securities Laws, 6 Eur. Comp. & Fin. L. Rev. 164 (2009).
77
Section 21D(e)(1) says that damages should be measured not by reference to the market
price immediately after disclosure of the truth but rather the mean trading price for a 90day period after such disclosure. See Robert B. Thompson, “Simplicity and Certainty” in
the Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5, 51 Bus. Law. 1177 (1996). The motivation
for this change was evidence from finance scholars that prices bounce back after an initial
overreaction to the evidence of fraud. See Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price
Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic and Policy Analysis, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 7
(1994). Some have read this as undermining the fraud on the market presumption because
of this realization of market inefficiency. See Grundfest, supra. But it seems to do just the
opposite: legislative toleration of evidence of efficiency as not inconsistent with Basic’s
presumption. See Langevoort, Animal Spirits, supra, at 182-86; Nathaniel Carden,
Comment, Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act for Judicial
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significantly on the presumption of reliance based on new developments in
finance (conventional and behavioral) if the Court really believes that the
contours of private securities liability were essentially frozen almost twenty
years ago. 78

IV. PRICE DISTORTION: DIGGING MORE DEEPLY

The fraud-on-the-market theory was devised to create a form of
corrective justice—compensating investors for real losses. 79 It might also
have beneficial effects in terms of deterring fraud, but that has always been
secondary. Justice Blackmun’s stubborn insistence that the reliance
requirement be preserved by making the presumption rebuttable
underscores this.
Much contemporary legal scholarship has been critical of fraud-onthe-market as a compensatory device, however. The arguments are by now
familiar enough that we can summarize here, too. 80 First, fraud produces
windfall gains for many investors along with losses—indeed, putting aside
insider trading in its various forms, the marketplace losses and gains are
roughly equal. Active traders are as likely to be winners as losers.
Compensating for the losses while ignoring the gains, even for the same
investor, leads to systematic overcompensation over time. Second, because
payments in judgment or settlement come from either a liability insurance
policy or the company itself, investors themselves are funding these
payouts, directly or indirectly—the so-called “circularity” argument. 81 (We
Presumptions of Market Efficiency, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 879 (1998). Otherwise it is hard to
explain why Congress made so many other changes without changing Basic’s presumption.
78
See Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 322 n.4 (5th Cir. 2005)(revisiting Basic is
for Congress, not the courts).
79
See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra.
80
See sources cited in note – supra.
81
See TOM BAKER & SEAN GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 134-36
(2010). See also Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities
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have known for some time that payouts by individual wrongdoers, i.e.,
company managers, are extremely uncommon 82). Together, these points
argue that the fraud-on-the-market system is a very costly, and somewhat
unnecessary, pocket-shifting mechanism.
While this argument has substantial traction, the main counterpoint
is that that the injuries are real when investors trade at distorted prices, and
simply can’t be assumed away by hoping that the victims will make up their
losses elsewhere. 83 Fraud causes injury to everyone who trades at a
distorted price without regard to whether there was meaningful reliance—
essentially the idea that Justice Brennan was pushing on Justice Blackmun.
One can then add on the deterrence argument: price distortion is a social
harm with many serious externalities, 84 and has to be policed. The fraudon-the-market class action is put forth by its proponents as practically
necessary, if not conceptually clean, for achieving both of these
objectives. 85
In this debate, two less familiar points are worth making about price
distortion. In theory, all plaintiffs should ever recover is the amount of the
price distortion at the time of the fraud (the conventional out-of-pocket
measure), so long as the truth was revealed before the plaintiff unwound its
position. But for a variety of reasons, litigants and courts shifted focus to

Litigation, 2009 Wisc. L. Rev. 333; James J. Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend,
108 Mich. L. Rev. 323 (2009).
82
See Michael Klausner et al., How Protective is D&O Insurance in Securities Class
Actions—An Update, 26 PLUS J., no. 5 (May 2013).
83
See Thomas A. Dubbs, A Scotch Verdict on “Circularity” and Other Issues, 2009 Wis.
L. Rev. 455; see also Goldberg & Zipursky, supra; Fisch, Confronting Circularity, supra;
Cox & Thomas, supra.
84
See Urska Velikonja, The Costs of Securities Fraud, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1887
(2013).
85
For a critique on the value-added deterrence from private litigation, see Amanda Rose,
The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 2173 (2010). For evidence of a deterrence effect, see JARED JENNINGS ET AL.,
THE DETERRENCE EFFECT OF SEC ENFORCEMENT AND CLASS ACTION LITIGATION (June
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868578 (class actions cause more compliant
behavior by peer firms of those targeted); see also Brian McTier & John Wald, The Causes
and Consequences of Securities Class Actions, 17 J. Corp. Fin. 649 (2011).
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corrective disclosure as the key to damages, 86 rather than price distortion
per se. Dura solidified this by stressing loss causation, making corrective
disclosure even more central to the assessment of plaintiffs’ injuries. As we
have seen, this has made a mess of loss causation and damage
measurements, and inspired the procedural moves designed to weed out the
speculative cases (and most cases are at least somewhat speculative) early
on.
Ironically, in the Blackmun-Brennan correspondence while Basic
was being written, Blackmun says that while he wants to avoid any
discussion of damages in the opinion, he agrees that the strict out-of-pocket
measure (which Brennan sees as the necessary corollary to his “price
reliance” approach 87) makes more sense than a rescissionary one that would
give the full merger value to the former Basic shareholders. Had that
impression made its way into the Basic opinion, the history of loss
causation and the emphasis on corrective disclosure under Rule 10b-5 might
have taken a completely different turn. Only price distortion would have
been important.
But what is price distortion, really? We have already seen the
challenge when the effect of the alleged lie is to lull investors into thinking
that nothing has changed about the company’s fundamentals, when change
is indeed occurring. Beyond this, the focus on measuring the market effects
of corrective disclosure obscures an underappreciated counterfactual

86

The key step here came when courts abandoned a strict out-of-pocket measure in favor of
a modified one that used the corrective disclosure date as a baseline for computing
damages, thereby making it closer to a rescission remedy. E.g., Harris v. American Inv.
Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
87
Letter of January 25, 1988, from Blackmun to Brennan, at 2 (“I had not thought the
opinion supported an argument for receiving the merger price . . . an argument we both
agree is largely implausible, but because it has not been briefed or discussed, we should not
presume to reject it out of hand here”)(on file with author). See also Letter of January 27,
1988, from Brennan to Blackmun (“if [there is no rebuttal and] the measure of damages is
ultimately resolved as the difference between the price actually received and the price that
would have been received had the market been fair, my view and your view will lead to
identical results, although by somewhat different routes”).
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difficulty about the nature of securities fraud in the first place. 88 Securities
regulation imposes only a limited duty on issuers and their managers to
reveal the truth—much can lawfully be concealed if the issuer prefers,
especially with respect to forward-looking information. That is a central
point made in Basic. However, if the issuer chooses to comment on a
matter, it must do so truthfully. Hence there is a large category of cases
where it is ambiguous what is meant by comparing the price that prevailed
at the time of the fraud with the price that would have prevailed in the
absence of the fraud. Is it the world where there simply was no lie or halftruth (but in which the issuer could have kept quiet about the truth) or are
we assuming a (legally non-existent) duty to reveal everything? This is a
very tricky inquiry, but note that investors deserve little or no recovery for
reliance on price integrity when the former is the right way of posing the
question.
Imagine, for example, a company that falsely states that things are
going smoothly for its flagship product when they really are not. If the
market price was $20 per share at the time, such an announcement would
have little effect on the price to the extent that the information just confirms
prior market expectations. Had the truth been told, assume that the price
would have dropped to $15. Should post-fraud purchasers receive $5 per
share? Only if we are confident that the right counterfactual is revelation of
the truth. If the more plausible counterfactual is instead that the issuer
chose (lawfully) to stay silent, those purchasers would presumably have
paid $20 for the stock even absent the fraud, and thus suffered no real
economic harm. In other words, the assumption that there are causal losses
to purchasers or sellers whenever there are material lies or omissions is not
necessarily true. Whenever the issuer had no legal duty to reveal the truth,
harm follows only when the effect of the lie or half-truth was to prevent
discovery of the truth. As tricky and important as this inquiry is, 89 it is
88

See Donald C. Langevoort, Compared to What? Econometric Evidence and the
Counterfactual Difficulty, 35 J. Corp. L. 183 (2009).
89
It is of course hard to think through whether the company would have been able to stay
silent on a matter in the face of shareholder, analyst and financial press scrutiny. Typically,
the half-truth is designed to throw these groups off their guard.

25

DRAFT: NOVEMBER 16, 2013

ignored entirely by contemporary doctrine, which simply assumes the truthtelling counterfactual by focusing solely on the market effects associated
with discovering the truth later on. In sum, we cannot say as confidently as
we do that fraud necessarily means investor injury in a setting that presumes
reliance on “price integrity.” 90
All of this has long suggested—to me and many others—that
Congress should revisit the entire remedial approach in the fraud-on-themarket setting, making it more clearly a deterrence-based mechanism. 91
Short of this, the courts are limited in what they can do to relatively hamfisted moves that threaten the very viability of the fraud-on-the-market class
action. Joe Grundfest has recently argued that because the proper approach
to damages has never been addressed by the Supreme Court, the courts
should “borrow” from Section 18 of the ’34 Act—which provides an
express cause of action for false SEC filings—an affirmative requirement of
reliance on the fraud itself in order to establish compensable injury. But
squaring such an approach to damages with Basic’s presumption of reliance
would be hard to do with a straight face, even if the Court did leave the
proper measure of damages to future consideration, and Grundfest pretty
much concedes that this is meant as a de facto overruling of Basic—
something he would actually prefer be done explicitly, and on which he
may get his way. Though admitting that arguments can be made either way,
he rejects the idea that the PSLRA is an endorsement of the status quo on

90

This, of course, is in addition to any doubts that we may have based on the possibility of
sentiment-driven overreactions to disclosures. See Langevoort, Animal Spirits, supra;
Cornell & Rutten, supra, at 463-68.
91
See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open Market Securities Fraud, 38
Ariz. L. Rev. 639 (1996); Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class
Actions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 501 (1996). There are many possible approaches, from damage
caps or disgorgement measures to what is effectively a qui tam procedure. As suggested
earlier, much judicial misunderstanding could have been avoided had Basic endorsed a
strict price distortion approach to damages, as both Justices Blackmun and Brennan seemed
to want. But unwinding the post-Dura loss causation to get to that simple approach would,
at this point, be very hard.
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reliance. To me, however, Amgen (which Grundfest thinks was wrongly
decided 92) suggests just the opposite.

V. CONCLUSION

In his dissent in Amgen, Justice Thomas traces the history of the
fraud-on-the-market prior to Basic by reference to two “signposts,” 93 one of
which was the seminal Ninth Circuit case of Blackie v. Barrack in 1975.94
That was a fruitless effort in terms of reading Blackie to say that materiality
was crucial to class certification—it holds no such thing—but also ironic.
Blackie justified the fraud-on-the-market presumption entirely in pragmatic
terms. While it expresses an intuition about organized markets and the
importance of price integrity, the main idea is simple: without class
certification there will be no practicable mechanism to address
demonstrable harm from securities fraud.
Candidly admitting that its
approach risked over-inclusion in the plaintiff class, the court reminded its
readers that the securities statutes were to “be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes, and that that purpose may be served only
by allowing an over-inclusive recovery to a defrauded class if the
unavailability of the class device renders the alternative a grossly underinclusive recovery.” 95
Basic starts out saying much the same thing, stressing that
presumptions exist mainly to do justice, but then wanders into the efficient
markets discussion as if it offers a better way of understanding reliance in
modern financial markets. It doesn’t, generating the uncertainty about class
certification that eventually led to Amgen and now the effort to overrule
92

See Brief of Former Commissioners and Academics as Amicus Curiae, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/1
1-1085_petitioner_amcu_sec-comm_etal.authcheckdam.pdf.
93
133 S.Ct. at 1213-14. The other was a Harvard Law Review student note.
94
524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
95
Id. at 906 n.22.
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Basic. Blackie’s argument was always the better one, and the fraud-on-themarket theory would have been on more solid ground (if no less
controversial) had that reasoning prevailed.
Today the Supreme Court is no long enamored with the “liberally
construed” rhetoric, 96 which naturally invites those dissatisfied with how
things have turned out to question the premises on which the fraud-on-themarket presumption rests. Hence Halliburton II. Given the Court’s oftexpressed inclination to shift responsibility for tough choices in Rule 10b-5
litigation to Congress, the question may come down to whether it thinks
Congress has already spoken with enough clarity to the issue.

96

See A.C. Pritchard, Launching the Insider Trading Revolution: SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 33, 50-51 (Stephen M.
Bainbridge, ed., 2013).
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